Political rhetoric and conceptions of nationhood

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Definitions of nationhood and citizen rights have changed over the last century from more national loyalty principles to more inclusive concepts of global and natural rights. International institutions such as the European Union, but also an increasing global civil society, have undermined the concept of distinct and separate nations. Yet these developments are not uncontested. Globally, but particularly in Europe, anti-immigrant protest movements are increasingly visible while nationalistic parties have been gaining influence in the political arena.

The aim of the contribution is to examine the effect of these political factors on people's conceptions of nationhood. Theoretical and macro-sociological accounts of nations and nationalism have emphasized the importance of political elites in the social construction of the national identity, yet their role has been largely left unstudied in in comparative survey research on nationhood. In turn, nationhood is understudied in political science accounts of political support, which have instead focused on satisfaction with democracy or political trust, even though the nation-state plays a central role in the Eastonian classification of system support.

The current contributions aims to fill this gap, examining whether and how political rhetoric influences people's conceptions of nationhood. Building on the literature on framing and elite cues, we hypothesize that not only the message per se but also the sender matters: people are more inclined to listen to and be persuaded by political rhetoric if it comes from politicians who share their partisanship.

We test the hypothesis in an analysis of party political rhetoric and individual attitudes in 38 countries and over time. The dependent variable is based on the respondents' views on which characteristics are important for being truly British, German, Austrian, etc. – which were included in the 1995, 2003, and 2013 modules of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). At the national level, the main independent variable is the political articulation of nationhood at the national level, as captured by Comparative Manifesto Project coding of party manifestos in the respective elections. At the

individual level, the independent variables are political affiliation as well as various socio-demographics.

Methodologically, a multilevel analysis is applied that considers both individual and contextual characteristics as well as changes over time in a single model. A novel unbalanced time-comparative design is used, which allows to include countries regardless of how many of the three ISSP waves were fielded. This strategy allows differentiating between over-time and cross-sectional effects, which has rarely been done in previous analyses.

The contribution thus speaks to two audiences: Firstly, to scholars who are interested in individuals' conceptualizations of nationhood, the changes of these conceptualizations over time, and the underlying political determinants. Secondly, it speaks to scholars who are interested in the methodological aspects of how to analyze cross-national and time-comparative survey data in unbalanced datasets.

Introduction

Research has repeatedly pointed to substantial differences in conceptions of nationhood across countries: in some countries, emphasis is put on a common ancestry, in others on shared experiences and values. In explaining this variation, studies typically consider the effects of affluence and economic security (Jones and Smith 2001b; Kunovich 2009) as well as group threat and economic struggle (Wright 2011a). A common denominator of these studies is a heavy emphasis on material factors such as economic development or demographic change. Yet, evidence for the effects of economic and cultural threat, conceived in such material terms, is ambiguous.

We propose that the consideration of ideational factors, in particular political rhetoric, adds another layer to these studies and might offer an explanation for their inconsistent findings. Ideational factors have been somewhat neglected in comparative survey research on nationhood and belonging, although these have been fruitfully analysed in areas such as social tolerance (Hadler 2012) and general trust (Helbling, Reeskens, and Stolle 2013) and emphasized in macro-sociological case studies of nations and nationalism (Anderson 1983; Smith 1991). The current article, therefore, aims to demonstrate that political ideas are important sources of individuals' normative conceptions of nationhood and belonging.

The empirical analysis combines macro-level data political rhetoric from the Comparative Manifesto Project with survey data collected within the National Identity waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 1995, 2003, and 2013. The data are combined into a three-wave cross-sectional design including 57,682 respondents from 45 countries, and analysed in a multilevel, unbalanced, time-comparative regression model. Citizens' conceptions of nationhood are measured by questions on the importance of a range of criteria for being truly part of one's nation. Methodologically, a multilevel analysis is applied that considers both individual and contextual characteristics as well as changes over time in a single model. A novel unbalanced time-comparative design is used, which allows to include countries regardless of how many of the three ISSP waves were fielded. This strategy allows differentiating between over-time and cross-sectional effects, which has been done rarely in previous analyses.

The contribution thus speaks to two audiences: Firstly, to scholars who are interested in individuals' conceptualizations of a nationhood, the changes of these conceptualizations over time, and the underlying determinants. Secondly, the paper speaks to scholars who are interested in the methodological aspects of how to analyze cross-national and time-comparative survey data in unbalanced datasets.

The following section discusses theories on conceptions of nationhood and their determinants. Section three describes in detail the research methods used: a longitudinal cross-sectional design and hierarchical regression models. Section four includes, first, an overview of societal differences in normative conceptions of nationhood that shows a substantial variation across countries as well as in changes over time. The consecutive hierarchical regression models reveal that, in addition to material factors such as economic development, ideational factors do indeed matter. The discussion and conclusion call for simultaneous consideration of economic, political, and world societal aspects in the analysis of nationhood.

Background: Materialistic and Ideational Explanations

Nations are socially constructed or, in the words of Anderson (1983), "imagined" communities. A variety of macro-level factors are said to influence in which terms they are imagined and in particular where their boundaries lie that delimit the national in-group from the out-group. The literature has distinguished between two ideal-typical conceptions of nationhood: ethnic and civic (e.g. Smith 1991). Ethnic conceptions refer to membership based on ascriptive criteria such as skin colour. Civic conceptions of nationhood, in contrast, refer to membership based on voluntarist criteria such as respect for norms and values. While the distinction has been elaborated in theoretical and case study research, it does not hold clearly at the individual level (Jones and Smith 2001a) and even where two dimensions are identified, they are often correlated rather than conflicting (Wright, Citrin, and Wand 2012). Similarly, our analysis of the ISSP data shows only one dimension that is consistent across nations and comprised of ethnic characteristics (see methods sections). In the following, we thus examine the determinants of ethnic or ascriptive conceptions of nationhood alone.

The role of material factors

Prior studies on normative conceptions of national symbolic boundaries as well as related phenomena, such as attitudes towards immigrants, are strongly influenced by theories of group threat (e.g. Kunovich 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Wright 2011a). In particular, the literature has emphasized economic and cultural threats. The former relates to material self-interest, suggesting that competition over scarce resources, such as jobs or housing, creates or increases the salience of group boundaries as well as mechanisms to protect in-group assets from out-group members. People's conceptions of who should have access to these resources narrows; in times of decreased economic prosperity and/or increased competition, citizens put a higher emphasis on ascriptive attributes of in-group membership. Similarly, cultural threat arises out of fear among in-group members over the weakening of their cultural norms and values when faced with increased diversity. Overall, then, such approaches suggest that a higher degree of immigration leads to stronger ethnocentric conceptions of the national community, particularly so among members of the in-group vulnerable to out-group competition, such as the less educated or unemployed. At the societal level, threat may be mediated through forms of higher levels of development (Jones and Smith 2001b; Kunovich 2009).

However, evidence for economic and cultural threat, thus conceived, is ambiguous. While some studies do find immigrant group size to affect individual-level attitudes (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006), others do not find any effect (Hjerm 2007; Sides and Citrin 2007), while again other studies support the alternative contact theory (Gundelach 2014), which argues that everyday encounters with out-group members might result in a learning process about the out-group and hence decrease, rather than increase, prejudice (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). Moreover, personal economic circumstances have repeatedly failed to obtain empirical support as determinant of attitudes towards immigration (see Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). These inconsistent findings suggest that contextual factors such as institutional and ideational forces might also play an important role, as we will point out in the subsequent section. Further, given our emphasis on these additional factors, we do not posit any hypotheses concerning material views and only include their main indicators as controls in our empirical analyses.

The role of institutional and ideational factors

Institutional and ideational factors go beyond the material ones already discussed and focus on ideas of nationhood and belonging. The political context influences the way individual citizens perceive the social boundaries of their nation by emphasizing and institutionalizing such social boundaries. Restrictive institutional environments encourage citizens to view ethnic and cultural diversity as a problem and hence emphasize ethnocentric views, whereas more open institutional environments may make civic nationhood, without ascriptive traits, more acceptable (Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, and Causey 2013). Such an ideational approach does not run counter to but aligns with the major theories on intergroup relations. Group threat theories concede that the threat does not necessarily need to be real but may be imagined or perceived (Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995). The framing of diversity as problematic would contribute to perceptions of group threat. Intergroup contact theory, often seen to be the major competitor to group threat theories, incorporates the effect of normative ideas explicitly, stating that positive effects of intergroup contact occur only if, amongst other conditions, intergroup contact is sanctioned by authorities, law, or custom (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). In the long run, as pointed out with regard to political tolerance and the positive effects of observing democratic bargaining processes (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), such exposure can result in learning effects and attitudinal change. In the following we focus on one factor that may mediate how individual citizens make sense of ethnic diversity: the rhetoric of political elites.

Political elites are said to affect both group boundary and feeling of belonging to the group by shaping public discourse (Wimmer, 2008a; Weber, et al., 2015). While contact theory proposes a positive effect of such rhetoric, the vast majority of studies on inter-group relations focuses on its polarizing effect (Allport 1954; Blumer 1958). Political rhetoric may affect normative conceptions in three ways (Bohmann 2011): it may reinforce or mitigate symbolic boundaries arising from longer-standing institutional frameworks or exogenous processes such as economic prosperity; it may increase the visibility of diversity; and it may bring ethnocentric views into the sphere of acceptance. That is, the more emphasis is put onto diversity, the more ethnocentric citizens should be. Previous studies on normative conceptions of national membership did not examine the effect of political rhetoric, but we can look to studies on related phenomena such attitudes towards immigrants or general social trust for an indication of the validity of the hypothesis. The evidence is ambiguous. While some studies do not find evidence for a link between rhetoric and attitudes and suggest not to overestimate the "constructionist power" of political elite rhetoric (Boonen and Hooghe 2014, 56; see also Hjerm and Schnabel 2010; Dunn and Singh 2011; Mudde 2013), others find that party rhetoric indeed has a deteriorating effect on ethnic relations, and not only when the rhetoric is negative (Sprague-Jones 2011): the mere mention of ethnic diversity suffices as it increases the salience of differences in society (Helbling, Reeskens, and Stolle 2013; Hopkins 2010). We would therefore expect that individuals in countries where political rhetoric emphasizes issues of diversity are more likely to define nationhood in ethnocentric terms. Moreover, it is likely that respondents are more strongly influenced by parties they support. We would therefore expect that individuals are more likely to define nationhood in ethnocentric terms if they share the political ideology of those parties emphasizing an ethnic over a civic discourse on issues of diversity.

Other institutional or ideational factors affect the link between political rhetoric and conceptions of nationhood, and we control for them in this paper. One such factor is the accommodation of diversity

in citizenship and multiculturalism policies, although theories diverge on the direction of the effect.[1] On the one hand, some scholars argue that multiculturalist policies directly increase acceptance for diverse bases of nationhood in the population and indirectly facilitate contact and exchange between different ethnic or cultural groups (Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995). Empirically, Bloemraad and colleagues, for example, have shown that multiculturalist policies contain any negative effect of immigration on social capital (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010) and may indeed foster immigrant incorporation (Wright and Bloemraad 2012). On the other hand, some scholars argue that multicultural policies emphasize ethnic and cultural differences between groups and thus cement social boundaries (e.g. Barry 2002). Citizens may worry that such policies undermine dominant cultural norms and values, which would lead to a backlash against the widening of the national boundary and hence an increase in ethnocentric conceptions of national membership. Indeed, Wright (2011b) finds that countries with multicultural policies experienced a stronger increase in ethnocentrist views over time.

Another ideational influence may be that of the international environment. World-society theory asserts that local actors acquire rationalized progressive inclinations to the extent that they are linked to the international society and associated cultural models (Meyer et al. 1997; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Linkage between societies and global cultural models is considered to be reflected in a society's membership in different international organizations and treaties. A core element of this international regime is human rights (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Meyer 2007), which started with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 that defined certain basic rights, such as the right to life, rights in civil and political society, political and religious freedoms, and social, economic, and cultural rights. The underlying rationale across these different realms is that rights are extended to individual actors and not assigned to specific social groups. As for citizenship rights, this trajectory in the human rights discourse has pressured states to increasingly extend membership rights to individuals beyond traditional national groups, which results in a diminished differentiation between citizens and non-citizens, as shown by Soysal (1994) for several European countries. A more inclusive definition of citizenship thus has become the dominant global cultural model (Ramirez and Meyer 2012). The following section outlines the measurement of the national and international factors.

Data and Methods

The empirical analysis is based on public opinion data collected by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 1995, 2003, and 2013 (ISSP Research Group 1998; 2012; 2015). The surveys are random samples, collected in face-to-face or mail interviews, and representative for the adult population of each country. Data was collected in a total of 45 countries (when distinguishing between East and West Germany), resulting in a total sample size of 57,682 respondents. Not all countries took part in all three waves, which results in a total of only 92 country-point observations (see Table 1 for an overview).

[1] While the theoretical considerations for citizenship and multiculturalism are very similar, we here focus only on multiculturalism due to data issues: the classification of countries according to citizenship regimes into jus soli, jus sanguini, and mixed regimes is very different across sources (compare Crepaz 2007; Bertocchi and Strozzi 2010). More detailed indices of citizenship regimes do exist but only for a limited number of countries. Moreover, they correlate strongly with the multiculturalism index used here (see Helbling 2013).

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is derived from a question battery, which was developed by the ISSP group to distinguish between "ethnic" and "civic" traits of nationhood. Respondents are asked: "Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is..." a) to have been born in [country], b) to have the [country] citizenship, c) to have lived in [country] for most of one's life, d) to be able to speak the [country] language, e) to be [religion], f) to respect the [country] political institutions and laws, and g) to feel the [country nationality]. The terms in [parenthesis] were replaced by names and the dominant religion of each country. Respondents were asked for each single item if they consider it very important, fairly important, not very important, or not important at all.

Factor analyses of the entire sample and of each wave result in two dimensions, with dimension 1 including the items to be born in the country, having citizenship, having lived there, and belonging to a particular religion; and dimension 2 including the items knowledge of language, respecting institutions, and to feel like a member. A more detailed examination of the factor structure for each country/wave observation shows that only the items to be born in the country, having lived there, and belonging to a particular religion load on the same dimension in almost all countries.[2] We thus restrict our analysis to an index comprising these three items and refer to this dimension, following Jones and Smith (2001a), as a preference for ascriptive characteristics of nationhood or as ethnocentric conceptualization of nationhood.

Measurement of political articulation

To measure *political rhetoric*, we use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, Volkens et al. 2015), which codes quasi-sentences of party manifestos for negative/positive stances towards a variety of policy dimensions. *Civic rhetoric* is captured by manifestos' positive references to equality (category 503), civic mindedness (606) and multiculturalism (607). *Ethnic rhetoric* covers positive references to national way of life (601) and traditional morality (603) as well as negative references to multiculturalism (608). We calculated the average salience per country for the respective elections before or in 1995, 2003, and 2013 for civic and ethnic rhetoric and the combined index considering both dimensions.[3]

In a second step, we examine the interaction between the general level of ethnic or civic rhetoric in a country and that of the respondent's favoured party. To do so, we match party affiliation at the individual level with the manifesto data at the party level.

[2] These three items load on the same factor in 88 out of 92 country–wave observations. Exceptions are the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where religion describes a separate dimension in the 2013 wave, and Israel (Jews and Arabs in different samples), where religion in 2003 and to be born in the country in 2013 load on another dimension. The reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of the three item index still meets the .5 criteria in these samples.

[3] In contrast to Helbling, Reeskens, and Stolle (2013), we do not include the following categories into civic rhetoric because these, although directly opposite to the categories mentioned for ethnic rhetoric, do not clearly signify civic rhetoric: 602 National Way of Life and 604 Traditional Morality. Further, we also calculated weighted indices, based on the party strength in the election. These weighted measures result in similar outcomes and thus are not reported (detailed codes and variables can be requested from the authors).

Control variables at the individual level

Aspects of group threat and economic position are considered by both structural and attitudinal indicators. Belonging to a minority is measured using the ISSP questions about respondents' ethnic, religious, and migration status. If a respondent reported an ethnic affiliation that is different from the dominant affiliation in their country, ethnic minority status is assigned. Similar to ethnic status, all respondents who do belong to the religious majority are coded as being a religious majority. Finally, it is also considered whether or not a respondent parent has the country's citizenship. The subjective dimension of identifying with a nation is measured by the reported closeness to a nation, based on a 4-point scale ranging from very close to not close at all.

Work status and income are included as possible sources of economic threat. Work status is measured by the categories working for pay, unemployed, disabled, in training or mandatory services, retired, housemaker, and others. As for the income, we decided to use household income as it was reported by more respondents than personal income. Given that income was collected in the different national currencies, we standardized it by dividing the reported income by the national mean. Further, we use the logarithm of this measure so that a value of zero stands for an average income, negative values for an income below the national average, and positive values for an income above average. In addition, the subjectively perceived threat is also considered and measured by an index of the four items asking respondents if immigrants increase crime rates, are generally good for economy, take jobs away from people, and make a society open to new ideas and cultures.

Education can be related to different levels of threat, but is also a proxy for exposure to global cultural models. It is measured in the number of years a respondent has spent in the educational system. The other indicators of exposure to world society are: Age in years and residence captured by the three categories large city, smaller city, and rural area. Finally, gender is also included as additional control variable with female being coded 1 and male 0.

Missing cases among the individual level variables are treated as embedded variables, which results in two regression coefficients (Hardy and Reynolds 2004): The first parameter indicates the effect of the variable of interest (e.g. closeness to the nation) on the dependent variable. The second parameter indicates the difference between repliers (e.g. closeness reported) and non-repliers (e.g. closeness question not answered) with regard to the dependent variable.

Control variables at the country level

Economic circumstances and threat due to immigration are captured by the level of prosperity and the size of the immigrant population. *National prosperity* is captured by GDP (in 1000 Euros) drawn from the World Bank (2016). *Immigration numbers* are based on UN collected data at the time or shortly before the ISSP surveys were conducted (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). Immigration levels are measured as the size of the immigrant population as percentage of the country's whole population. Immigration numbers for Taiwan were taken from the webpage of the National Immigration Agency (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2016).

Ties to world society are measured by "the number of organizations of which a country or territory is a member, whether directly or through the presence of members in that country" (UIA, 2014: 45). World Society scholars consider this variable a proxy for embedding in a world culture. It was taken

from the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of International Associations various years) and logged.

We measure *multicultural policies* with the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) by Banting and Kymlicka (2013). We chose MCP over other indices because, while it focuses on multiculturalist policy, the indicators address some of the same concepts as conceptions of nationhood. The MCP provides a measure of multiculturalist accommodation policies "designed to recognize, accommodate and support the cultural differences of minority groups" (Banting and Kymlicka 2013, 583). To construct the index, the authors scored and aggregated indicators of multicultural policies across areas such education, media, or culture as either 0 (no such policy), 0.5 (partial), or 1 (clear policy). The multiculturalism variables, however, are available only for a limited number of countries. Similar to the individual level, we thus included embedded variables – that is dummy variables for missing info – in order to keep all countries in our regression models. All other macro-level variables are available for all countries and time-points. We, nonetheless, re-run all models considering only countries with valid cases in all macro-level variables. These additional models yield very similar results.

Analysis strategy

The data is hierarchically structured in individuals, countries, and survey waves with different respondents in each wave. This design can be analyzed using the following hierarchical model: Country invariant characteristics as level 3, country characteristics that change over time, such as the number of INGOs at a given wave, as level 2, and respondents' answers as level 1. This design allows distinguishing between the cross-sectional effects and the longitudinal effects of a variable such as the overall level of wealth and its changes over time (Fairbrother 2014). For this purpose, a macro-level variable's mean value across all three waves has to be included for each country as a level three variable. In addition, the growth variable (macro-level variable at a given wave minus the country average across all three waves) is included at level two. The modelling thus allows us to distinguish between the effects of the overall size of the immigration population and that of growing numbers of immigrants, the effects of the overall wealth and those of changing prosperity, effects of the overall embedding in world society and those of a growing or declining embedding over time, and so on.

Results

Ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood: Magnitude and trends over time

Table 1 provides an overview of the average preferences for ascriptive features of nationhood in all available countries and time-points. Scores are based on the answers to the items to be born in the country, to have lived there most of one's life, and to belong to a particular religion. The values can range from 1 to 4 with the former indicating "not important at all" and the latter "very important". A higher value represents stronger ethnocentric views. Countries are sorted from high to low, according to the latest data available. Ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood are thus very strong in the Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela, and comparably weak in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Estonia.

< About here TABLE 1 and FIGURE 1 >

Figure 1, in addition, shows the changes in ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood over time for countries which took part in at least two waves. Change is based on the difference between the latest

and the earliest data available. Considering the very different trajectories, this figure does not indicate any dominant pattern of change, such as an increase in most countries. This is also reflected in the numbers presented below Figure 1, which number the changes in our sample and show that ethnocentric conceptions have increased and declined in about the same number of countries.

Considering these descriptive findings and rankings of countries, Table 1 tentatively shows that countries that are relatively prosperous in terms of GDP and well integrated in the global world are characterized by rather low preferences for ascriptive nationhood traits, whereas countries that are more peripheral are characterized by more ethnocentric conceptualizations. Such a division is less clear as far as the changes over time are concerned, as more affluent countries can be found in both columns – countries with increasing and countries with declining ethnocentric views.

Determinants of ethnocentric conceptualization of citizenship: Multilevel analysis

< About here TABLE 2 >

The discussion in the previous section was based on descriptive statistics only. This section presents the results of multilevel regressions that consider both the influence of individual level and contextual characteristics on individual conceptualizations of nationhood. Table 2 displays the results of the micro-level part of these regressions. It shows that women, older respondents and individuals who live in a rural area have a stronger preference for ascriptive characteristics, whereas this preference declines with increasing education and family income. As for the work status, stronger ethnocentric conceptualizations can be reported for unemployed and disabled respondents as well as for the retired and homemakers. As for minority status, respondents who do not belong to the religious majority as well as respondents with at least one non-citizen parent have less ethnocentric preferences in terms of nationhood traits. The effect of belonging to an ethnic minority is also negative, but is insignificant. Alongside these more structural characteristics, attitudinal aspects also have significant effects. Ethnocentric views are stronger among respondents who have negative views about migrants and individuals who feel close to their nation. Respondents affiliated with parties with stronger civic rhetoric have weaker preference for ascriptive characteristics, while those affiliated with parties with stronger ethnic rhetoric have stronger preferences.

After specifying this micro-level model, various macro-level variables were included to test our hypotheses about the effects of the context. Given the limited number of countries and time-country observations, all indicators were first entered individually in addition to the micro-level model. As described in the methods section, variables that change over time such as affluence are included as a country level average and as a growth variable. Table 3a thus reports two effects for these variables – a country level and a wave level effect. Each line also reports the -2LL value which can be used to gauge the fit of each model.

< About here TABLE 3a >

A first point of reference is the model which includes a wave indicator in addition to the previous micro-level model and thus captures overall changes over time. Given the diverse trends depicted in Figure 1 a random slope model is used, which allows the wave effect to vary across countries. It indicates an overall positive effect over time – and thus increasing preferences for ethnocentric traits of nationhood – which, however, varies significantly across countries. The subsequent models aim to explain the changes over time and thus do not include this wave indicator any longer.

As for our substantive variables, Table 3a shows that ethnocentric conceptualizations of nationhood are weaker in societies with higher levels of diversity-related rhetoric, no matter whether of ethnic or civic persuasion. It thus seems to be more important that these topics are addressed than that they are addressed in a specific way. There is no association with change in rhetoric over time.

As for the controls, ethnocentric conceptualizations of nationhood are stronger in less affluent societies, but increase with growing affluence. Additional models show (not displayed in the tables) that the absolute level of wealth and its growth effect interact negatively – ethnocentric views thus are particularly strong in initially less affluent societies, which have experienced a strong economic growth. This description applies to many Eastern European countries and, considering the findings of Figure 1, many of these countries are indeed in the group of countries with increased ethnocentric preferences. The second control variable, links to world society, is significant only at the wave level, where increasing links to world society are associated with stronger ethnocentric views. Just like with GDP, this relationship may be driven by countries with strong growth in world society links over the past two decades, such as the post-communist countries. The size of the migrant population is significant only at the country level, where larger numbers of migrants are associated with lower preferences for ethnocentric conceptualizations of citizenship.

< About here TABLE 3b >

Table 3b shows the effects of the macro-level variables when combined in single models. As for the controls, immigration loses its significance when combined with GDP (Model 0). The substantive models (1-4) thus include only GDP as control. Model 1 indicates that the growth effect of INGOs does not remain significant when combined with GDP, whereas the wave effect of GDP becomes insignificant, too. Models 2-3 show that the ethnic and civic rhetoric variables separately remain insignificant when controlled for GDP and that both the overall effect and the growth effect of affluence remain significant. Model 4 shows that overall rhetoric does remain significant even when controlling for GDP.

< About here TABLE 4 >

Table 4 includes all the individual-level variables of Table 2, GDP and overall rhetoric as in Model 4 in Table 3b, as well as interaction terms between overall rhetoric in a society and the levels of civic and ethnic rhetoric of the specific parties supported by each respondent. The model shows, as in Table 2, that respondents supporting a party with stronger civic rhetoric have weaker preferences for ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood, while respondents supporting a party with stronger ethnic rhetoric have stronger preferences for ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood. In addition, the interaction between party- and country-level rhetoric is positively significant. That is, in societies with a strong emphasis on issues of diversity, the extent of civic rhetoric of one's preferred party matters less.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our paper started from the assumption that material factors such as economic prosperity or the level of immigration alone are not able to explain ethnocentric conceptions of the ideal citizen. Instead, national and international ideational factors also play a role. In particular we examined the influence of political rhetoric, controlling for multiculturalist policies as well as embeddedness in world society,

by combining macro-level indicators of these concepts with micro-level data from three waves of the ISSP surveys on national identity.

At the micro-level, the findings of this paper are more or less in line with our and the general expectations. Migration background and minority status result in less ethnocentric conceptualizations of nationhood, an effect that also holds true for higher social status and better economic circumstances. In addition, educated respondents, younger individuals, and urban (compared to rural) dwellers express less ethnocentric conceptualizations of nationhood. Finally, conservative political views, an anti-immigration stance, and a strong national identity further foster preferences for ethnocentric nationhood traits.

The main focus of this paper, however, was on the effects of the macro-level on individual preferences for ethnocentric conceptualizations of nationhood. Here, the empirical findings support our ideas that political rhetoric influence the respondents' preferences for ethnocentric traits of nationhood. The effects, however, are not as straightforward as initially expressed. Rhetoric does matter, but rather in the sense that it is important that topics of ethnicity and civic forms of nationhoods are addressed: rhetoric decreases rather than increases ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood. Thus, contrary to hypotheses driven by group threat theories that increasing the salience of diversity in the political environment would increase threat perceptions, our findings suggest a learning effect: individuals are aware that nationhood need not be based on ascriptive attributes such as ancestry or religion. The constructivist view that symbolic boundaries are constantly renegotiated (e.g. Chandra 2012) thus seems to apply in our case. Political rhetoric does have "constructivist power", but not necessarily the negative one which previous research emphasized (Sprague-Jones 2011; Helbling, Reeskens, and Stolle 2013). Our study thus shows that the "learning effect" discussed by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) with regard to political tolerance may also work as far as ethnocentric conceptualizations of nationhood are concerned.

Our paper is also of relevance beyond academia and can be of particular importance for policy-makers. Here, the finding that rhetoric decreases ethnocentric conceptualizations of nationhood suggests that open societies can be rather achieved through open discussions of all aspects and not through censuring of certain opinions. This is also of relevance as ethnocentric conceptions of the national community have been connected to reduced social capital (Reeskens and Wright 2013) as well as reduced support for policies favoring immigration and immigrants (Wright 2011a). Knowing whether and how ideas and rhetoric influence such conceptions could contribute to more cohesive societies.

Table 1. Preference for ascriptive features (countries ranked according to latest wave available)

	1995	2003	2013
21 Philippines (PH)	3,48	3,56	3,66
40 South Africa (ZA)			3,56
36 Venezuela (VE)		3,47	
51 Turkey (TR)			3,44
18 Russia (RU)		3,21	3,35
17 Bulgaria (BG)	3,30		
46 Georgia (GE)			3,29
31 Chile (CL)		3,26	
16 Poland (PL)	2,85	3,24	
50 Mexico (MX)			3,20
48 India (IN)			3,19
27 Slovak Republic (SK)	2,68	2,71	3,11
43 Uruguay (UY)		3,05	
7 Austria (AT)	2,98	3,02	
8 Hungary (HU)	2,72	2,82	2,99
20 Canada (CA)	2,34	2,97	
9 Italy (I)	2,96		
42 South Korea (KR)		2,90	2,94
14 Czech Republic (CZ)	2,63	2,80	2,91
10 Ireland (IE)	3,21	3,15	2,91
52 Belgium (BE)			2,91
49 Lithuania (LT)			2,90
6 United States (US)	2,94	3,22	2,83
22 Israel Jews + Arabs (IL)		3,13	2,83
4 Great Britain (GB)	2,88	2,83	2,83
25 Spain (ES)	2,97	2,92	2,81
44 Croatia (HR)			2,81
19 New Zealand (NZ)	2,67	2,77	
26 Latvia (LV)		2,70	2,75
1 Australia (AU)	2,53	2,73	
24 Japan (JP)	2,84	2,92	2,73
30 Portugal (PT)		3,09	2,71
33 Switzerland (CH)		2,58	2,67
12 Norway (NO)	2,62	2,60	
41 Taiwan (TW)		2,64	2,58
2 Germany-West (DE-W)	2,48	2,62	2,58
32 Denmark (DK)			2,54
47 Iceland (IS)			2,50
28 France (FR)		2,45	2,49
37 Finland (FI)		2,60	2,47
3 Germany-East (DE-E)	2,53	2,43	2,46
15 Slovenia (SI)	2,82	2,68	2,45
45 Estonia (EE)			2,33
11 Netherlands (NL)	2,24		
13 Sweden (SE)	2,35	2,26	2,11

Source: ISSP 1995, 2003, and 2013. Country mean values of scale based on items being on in the country, having lived there almost the entire life, and belong to a certain denomination. Unweighted data. Limited to respondents who reported their party affiliation. N=57682

Figure 1. Changes in preferences for ascriptive features



	Increase*		Decrease
CA	0,63	NO	-0,02
SK	0,43	GB	-0,05
PL	0,39	TW	-0,06
CZ	0,28	DE-E	-0,07
HU	0,27	US	-0,11
AU	0,2	JP	-0,11
PH	0,18	FI	-0,13
RU	0,14	ES	-0,16
NZ	0,1	SE	-0,24
DE-W	0,1	IE	-0,3
CH	0,09	IL	-0,3
LV	0,05	SI	-0,37
AT	0,04	PT	-0,38
KR	0,04		
FR	0,04		

Source: ISSP 1995, 2003, and 2013. Limited to countries which took part in at least two rounds and respondents who reported their party affiliation. N=57682

Based on the difference between the most recent and the earliest data available for each country, as shown in Table 1.

Table 2. Individual level determinants of preference for ascriptive traits

Model	Variable	B	SE	Sig.
	Constant	1.61	.047	**
	Party civic	-.003	.001	**
	Party ethnic	.010	.001	**
	Female	.030	.006	**
	Age (years)	.005	.000	**
	Education (years)	-.023	.001	**
	Residence (ref=small city)			
	Large city	-.014	.007	
	Rural area	.032	.010	**
	Household income (low – high)	-.053	.005	**
	Ethnic minority	-.006	.011	
	Religious minority	-.216	.007	**
	Parent(s) non-citizen	-.172	.012	**
	Immigration stance (positive - negative)	.232	.004	**
	National identity (low-high)	.161	.011	**
	Work Status (ref=working for pay)			
	Unemployed	.015	.013	
	In training	-.014	.015	
	Retired	.056	.010	**
	Disabled	.067	.021	**
	Homemaker	.040	.012	**
	Other	.013	.024	
	-2loglikelihod value: 110363			

Linear hierarchal regression, 3 levels with 38 country observations, 76 wave-country observations, and 54973 respondents, RIGLS estimation with robust sandwich estimators.

Also included but not shown in Table 2: embedded variables for missing answers in income, residence, party preference, ethnicity, immigration stance, and national identity.

Unstandardized coefficients, ** p = .01, * p=.05, $^{+}$p = .01

Table 3a. The influence of the context on individual preferences for ascriptive traits (single macro-level factors in addition to bottom line micro-level model of Table 2)

Variable	Level of Effect		-2LL value
	Country	Wave	
Wave1)	Random variance: 013**	.066**	110354
GDP	-.207**	.136**	110349
INGO	-.072	.082**	110355
Immigrants (%)	-.012*	.000	110361
Multiculturalism	-.028	.005	110362
Manifesto Ethnic	-.019	.002	110362
Manifesto Civic	-.023+	.003	110361
Manifesto All	-.017*	.002	110360

Linear hierarchal regression, 3 levels with 38 country observations, 76 wave-country observations, and 54973 respondents, RIGLS estimation with robust sandwich estimators.

Unstandardized coefficients, ** p = .01, * p=.05, $^{+}$p = .01

1) The Wave effect was allowed to vary across countries. The slope variance is significant. There is, however, no significant covariation between the slope and the intercept.

Table 3b. The influence of the context on individual preferences for ascriptive traits (combined macro-level factors in addition to micro-level model of Table 2)

Variable	Level	Model 0 1)	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
INGO	Country		.082			
	Wave		.055			
Manifesto Ethnic	Country			-.026		
	Wave			.003		
Manifesto Civic	Country				-.017	
	Wave				.007	
Manifesto Overall	Country					-.016*
	Wave					.004
GDP	Country	-.163**	-.249**	-205**	-.187**	-.193**
	Wave	.210**	.051	.143**	.140**	.142**
Immigration	Country	-.007				
	Wave	-.018				
-2LL		110346	110347	110346	110346	110344

Linear hierarchal regression, 3 levels with 38 country observations, 76 wave-country observations, and 54973 respondents, RIGLS estimation with robust sandwich estimators. Unstandardized coefficients, ** p = .01, * p=.05, $^{+}$p = .01

1) Given that immigration was not significant all subsequent models use only GDP as control.

Table 4. Interaction between individual party rhetoric and societal climate

Model	Variable	B	SE	Sig.
	Party Civic	-.011	.002	*
	Party Ethnic	.011	.002	*
	Manifesto All Country	-.020	.008	*
	Manifesto All Over time	.005	.004	
	Interactions:			
	Party Civic * Manifesto overall Country (*1000)	.609	.192	**
	Party Civic * Manifesto overall over time (*1000)	.261	.194	
	Party Ethnic * Manifesto overall Country (*1000)	.010	.162	
	Party Ethnic * Manifesto overall over time (*1000)	-.499	.147	*

Only Manifesto overall considered in the interaction models, as our analyses have shown that only the total rhetoric matters. The models shown here include all variables of Table 2 plus the final model of Table 3b.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Overview of country-level characteristics*

Year	Country	GDP per capita	Immi-grants %	INGO	Multi-cultural	Ethnic Rhetoric	Civic R	Overall R
1995	1 Australia (AU)	21035	22.9	1851	5	5.2	2.6	7.8
	2 Germany-West (DE-W)	23066	9.1	2974	0	1.9	5.8	7.7
	3 Germany-East (DE-E)	23066	9.1	2974	0	1.9	5.8	7.7
	4 Great Britain (GB)	21032	7.2	2846	2.5	3.4	4.8	8.3
	6 United States (US)	28782	10.7	2273	3			
	7 Austria (AT)	23688	11.2	2243	0	2.4	12.2	14.7
	8 Hungary (HU)	9098	3.1	1617		3.5	4.9	8.5
	9 Italy (I)	21934	3.1	2791	0	3.6	7.1	10.7
	10 Ireland (IE)	18386	6.2	1637	1	2.7	10.1	12.8
	11 Netherlands (NL)	22856	8.7	2741	2.5	1.2	5.4	6.6
	12 Norway (NO)	23565	5.4	2248	0	6.2	6.9	13.1
	13 Sweden (SE)	22734	10.6	2545	3	2.9	17.9	20.8
	14 Czech Republic (CZ)	13795	1.6	609		3.8	8.3	12.1
	15 Slovenia (SI)	13217	8.8	528		4.4	6.8	11.3
	16 Poland (PL)	7432	2.5	1626		0.3	2.8	3.2
	17 Bulgaria (BG)	5543	0.4	1009		1.4	8.1	9.5
	18 Russia (RU)	5626	8.0	822		8.4	6.8	15.2
	19 New Zealand (NZ)	17748	16.0	1274	2.5	1.7	7.9	9.7
	20 Canada (CA)	23192	16.6	2043	5			
	21 Philippines (PH)	2899	0.3	953				
	24 Japan (JP)	22945	1.1	1863	0	0.0	1.9	1.9
	25 Spain (ES)	16405	2.6	2626	0	0.8	4.5	5.3
	26 Latvia (LV)	5400	21.6	288		7.9	4.8	12.7
	27 Slovak Republic (SK)	8463	1.3	462		3.9	9.9	13.8
2005	1 Australia (AU)	29781	23.0	6167	8	11.8	11.4	23.3
	2 Germany-West (DE-W)	29285	11.0	10207	2	3.7	9.6	13.2
	3 Germany-East (DE-E)	29285	11.0	10207	2	3.7	9.6	13.2
	4 Great Britain (GB)	31152	8.0	10139	5.5	3.2	6.8	9.9
	6 United States (US)	39677	12.3	8640	3			
	7 Austria (AT)	32161	12.4	6688	1	1.1	7.4	8.5
	8 Hungary (HU)	15573	2.9	4925		6.2	6.1	12.2
	10 Ireland (IE)	35745	9.1	5431	1.5	0.3	9.9	10.2
	12 Norway (NO)	38287	6.5	6427	0	2.3	6.6	9.0
	13 Sweden (SE)	32024	11.3	7827	5	3.1	9.7	12.8
	14 Czech Republic (CZ)	19584	2.2	4512		7.2	3.6	10.8
	15 Slovenia (SI)	20919	8.6	2805		4.3	10.3	14.6
	16 Poland (PL)	12030	2.1	5225		4.7	2.3	7.1
	17 Bulgaria (BG)	8396	0.5	3034		2.1	5.8	7.9
	18 Russia (RU)	9254	8.1	4463		5.4	7.4	12.8
	19 New Zealand (NZ)	23717	17.6	4034	5	8.6	6.4	15.0
	20 Canada (CA)	32032	18.0	7073	7.5	1.1	4.1	5.2
	21 Philippines (PH)	3748	0.4	3279				
	22 Israel Jews + Arabs (IL)	22268	30.8	4284				
	24 Japan (JP)	27944	1.3	5756	0			
	25 Spain (ES)	25305	4.1	8483	1	0.6	7.4	8.0
	26 Latvia (LV)	10812	18.1	1867		5.4	6.2	11.6
	27 Slovak Republic (SK)	13912	2.2	2840		4.3	3.2	7.5
	28 France (FR)	28058	10.6	10653	2	4.6	10.6	15.2
	30 Portugal (PT)	19798	6.3	5908	2	2.2	7.4	9.6
	31 Chile (CL)	10950	1.2	3309				
	32 Denmark (DK)	31229	7.0	7263	0.5	14.1	10.6	24.7

	33 Switzerland (CH)	36372	21.9	7808	1	15.2	10.9	26.1
	36 Venezuela (VE)	9985	4.1	2850				
	37 Finland (FI)	28779	2.6	6652	1.5	4.4	5.5	9.9
	40 South Africa (ZA)	3467	2.2	4303		6.4	9.1	15.5
	41 Taiwan (TW)	27500	2.0	2546				
	42 South Korea (KR)	21340	0.5	3233		0.6	3.4	4.0
	43 Uruguay (UY)	9435	2.7	2289				
2013	2 Germany-West (DE-W)	44469	14.4	11386	2.5	3.1	11.3	14.4
	3 Germany-East (DE-E)	44469	14.4	11386	2.5	3.1	11.3	14.4
	4 Great Britain (GB)	38452	12.1	11213	5.5	5.5	3.3	8.8
	6 United States (US)	53041	14.3	9520	3	7.3	6.1	13.4
	8 Hungary (HU)	23482	4.4	5707		5.1	10.4	15.5
	10 Ireland (IE)	46140	15.8	5955	3	1.1	3.9	5.0
	12 Norway (NO)	65461	10.8	7050	3.5			
	13 Sweden (SE)	45148	14.8	8616	7	4.7	11.6	16.3
	14 Czech Republic (CZ)	28224	3.8	5305		2.4	4.9	7.2
	15 Slovenia (SI)	28996	12.4	3561		2.0	6.3	8.3
	18 Russia (RU)	24114	7.8	5187		11.7	8.1	19.8
	21 Philippines (PH)	6535	0.2	3571				
	22 Israel Jews + Arabs (IL)	32760	26.3	4542				
	24 Japan (JP)	36450	1.7	6260	0			
	25 Spain (ES)	32925	13.5	9602	3.5	0.4	8.3	8.7
	26 Latvia (LV)	22560	15.0	2522				
	27 Slovak Republic (SK)	26642	2.7	3488		4.0	8.4	12.3
	28 France (FR)	37872	11.4	11754	2	3.3	6.4	9.7
	30 Portugal (PT)	26759	7.2	6587	3.5	0.1	6.5	6.6
	32 Denmark (DK)	43445	9.2	7925	0	5.9	9.4	15.3
	33 Switzerland (CH)	56565	26.5	8596	1			
	37 Finland (FI)	39812	4.6	7327	6	4.9	11.2	16.1
	40 South Africa (ZA)	3959	3.8	4788		5.1	8.7	13.9
	41 Taiwan (TW)	39600	2.2	2884				
	42 South Korea (KR)	33140	1.9	3866		0.1	4.3	4.4
	44 Croatia (HR)	21366	13.3	3362		1.3	7.4	8.8
	45 Estonia (EE)	25452	16.4	2836		7.7	6.2	13.8
	46 Georgia (GE)	7176	4.3	1287		3.3	6.6	9.8
	47 Iceland (IS)	41939	11.0	2681		0.9	14.8	15.7
	48 India (IN)	5412	0.4	5550				
	49 Lithuania (LT)	25467	5.1	2772		5.8	6.3	12.1
	50 Mexico (Mx)	16463	0.8	4981		0.3	3.3	3.7
	51 Turkey (TR)	19020	1.9	4282		2.1	4.7	6.9
	52 Belgium (BE)	41663	9.6	9718	5.5	3.0	8.3	11.2

*blank cells indicate missing data, sources and coding see data and methods section

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